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NOTES AND COMMENTS
with this problem when mutual benefit association certificates were in-
volved. 20 Concededly, these cases are distinguishable in that the asso-
ciation's charter or by-laws contained a provision for alternative or
contingent beneficiaries if the original designation failed; yet, any 'dis-
tinction appears unreal when an old line insurance policy contains a con-
tingent beneficiary provision.
As the precise issue presented by the Bullock case was one of first
impression before any court of final jurisdiction in the United States,21
it is regrettable that the decision reached was contrary to the existing
authority on the subject. Furthermore, as the result was patently con-
trary to the intention of the insured22 and will probably be binding on
the court under the doctrine of stare decisis, the following statutory
proposal is offered for consideration:
Where the beneficiary of a life insurance policy or certificate, or
the assignee of such policy or certificate, or the survivor of a
joint life policy or certificate, has feloniously taken, or procured to
be taken, the life of the insured, any proceeds payable under the
terms of such policy or certificate shall be paid to any alternative
or contingent beneficiary named in the policy or certificate who
does not claim through the slayer; provided, if no alternative or
contingent beneficiary is designated in the policy or certificate,
such proceeds shall be paid to the estate of the insured decedent. 23
DAVID L. STRAIN, JR.
Negligence-Automobiles-Joint Enterprise
In cases involving automobile accidents, North Carolina has recog-
nized and followed the joint enterprise doctrine since 1921.1 In a re-
cent 'decision, James v. Atlantic & E. C. R. R.,2 the court stated that
20 Supreme Lodge v. Menkhausen, 209 Ill. 277, 70 N. E. 567 (1904) ; Schmidt
v. Northern Life Ass'n., 112 Ia. 41, 83 N. W. 800 (1900); Sharpless v. Grand
Lodge, 135 Minn. 35, 159 N. W. 1086 (1916).
21 See note 3 supra.
Bullock v. Expressmen's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N. C. 254, 258, 67 S. E. 2d
71, 74 (1951) (". . . in the case at bar it may be presumed in the light of subse-
quent happenings the insured would have wished his foster son to have the in-
surance money. .. ").
2 See Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfidly Killing Another-A Statu-
tory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REv. 715, 741 (1936), for an extensive discussion of the
intent and purpose of such a statute.
1Pusey v.* Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 181 N. C. 137, 106 S. E. 452 (1921).
In the Pusey case the court seemingly states that the doctrine of joint enterprise
was adopted by North Carolina in Hunt v. Railroad, 170 N. C. 442, 87 S. E. 210
(1915), but the court in the Hunt case does not mention the doctrine. It merely
reiterates the rule that the negligence of the driver will not be imputed to a pas-
senger unless he is the owner of the car or controls the driver in some way.
2 233 N. C. 591, 65 S. E. 2d 214 (1951). Other N. C. cases dealing with the
doctrine are: Matheny v. Central Motor Lines, 233 N. C. 681, 65 S. E. 2d 368
(1951) ; Rollison v. Hicks, 233 N. C. 99, 63 S. E. 2d 190 (1951) ; Pike v. Seymour,
222 N. C. 42, 21 S. E. 2d 884 (1942) ; Harper v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 211
N. C. 398, 190 S. E. 750 (1937); Exum v. Poole, 207 N. C. 244, 176 S. E. 556
19521
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when two or more persons are engaged in a joint enterprise, the con-
tributory negligence of one of them will be imputed to the others so as
to bar their recovery against a negligent defendant.3
In the James case, the plaintiff and the driver of the automobile
were police officers, fellow employees of the city of Goldsboro, and were
of equal rank. While engaged in their duty of patrolling the city, they
were involved in an accident with a switch engine belonging to the
defendant railroad. The court concluded that there was sufficient evi-
dence to support a finding that the officers were engaged in a joint
enterprise; that they were mutually engaged in a joint undertaking for
a common purpose; and each had an equal right of control in the man-
agement of the automobile. Therefore, any contributory negligence on
the part of the driver would be imputed to the plaintiff so as to bar his
recovery from the defendant.
In the famous case of Thorogood v. Bryan,4 the court held that the
negligence of the driver of a conveyance would be imputed to a pas-
senger therein. But the English court later repudiated this unreasonable
rule in the case of Mills v. Arntrong5 insofar as it was applied to
passengers having no control over the driver. Though some American
courts followed the rule of the Thorogood decision, most of them have
likewise repudiated its original broad application and now hold that the
negligence of the driver will not be imputed to a inere passenger or
guest.6 North Carolina has never adopted the broad rule of the Thoro-
good case.
7
One of the exceptions to the general proposition that the negligence
of a driver will not be imputed to a passenger is the doctrine of imputed
negligence as applied in the case of a joint enterprise.8 The scope of
(1934); Newman v. Queen City Coach Co., 205 N. C. 26, 169 S. E. 808 (1933);
Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C. 749, 161 S. E. 389 (1931) ; Albritton v. Hill, 190
N. C. 429, 130 S. E. 5 (1925) ; Pusey v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 181 N. C. 137,
106 S. E. 452 (1921).
' However, the case was sent back for a new trial because of erroneous instruc-
tions given by the trial judge with respect to the burden of proof on the issue of
contributory negligence.
The terms johit enterprise and imputed negligence, should not be confused.
Imputed negligence is used to hold one person liable for the negligence of another
in certain situations. Joint enterprise is one of those situations where negligence
will be imputed.
'8 C. B. 115 (1849).
13 App. Cas. 1, 58 L. T. 425 (1887).
o Bessey v. Salemme, 302 Mass. 188, 19 N. E. 2d 75 (1939) ; Bunting v. Hog-
sett, 139 Pa. 363, 21 Atl. 31 (1890) ; Reiter v. Grober, 173 Wisc. 493, 181 N. W.
739 (1921) ; See collection of cases in 38 Am. JUR. p. 936 n. 20 (1941).
'Duval v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 134 N. C. 331, 46 S. E. 750 (1904);
Crampton v. Ivie, 124 N. C. 591, 32 S. E. 968 (1889).
82 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW, §28 (1927); Negligence
may, of course be imputed in master-servant relationships, Rollison v. Hicks, 233
N. C. 99, 65 S. E. 2d 190 (1951), and principal-agent relationships, Snow v.
DeButts, 212 N. C. 120, 193 S. E. 224 (1937), and when the doctrine of joint
enterprise can be applied.
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this note is primarily concerned with the application of the doctrine of
imputed negligence in automobile accident cases where the occupants
of one of the vehicles were engaged in a joint enterprise at the time of
the accident.
As the court states in the principal case, "much has been written on
what is not a joint enterprise, rather than what is."9  In the James case
however, the court quotes the following excellent statement of the rule
from Blashfield.' 0
"An essential and perhaps the central element which must be
shown in order to establish a joint enterprise is the existence of
joint control over the management and operation of the vehicle
and the course and conduct of the trip . . . in order that two per-
sons riding in an automobile, one of them driving, may be deemed
engaged in a joint enterprise for the purpose of imputing the neg-
ligence of the driver to the other, [there must] exist concurrently
two fundamental and primary requisites, to wit, a community of
interest in the object and purpose of the undertaking in which the
automobile is being driven, and an equal right to direct and govern
the movements and conduct of each other in respect thereto. The
mere fact that the occupant has no opportunity to exercise physi-
cal control is immaterial." 11
Some states have held that a joint enterprise may exist without the
element of the legal right of joint control. 12 But apparently North Caro-
lina has, from the first case dealing with the subject, required the
presence of the legal right to control, or actual control of the operation
of the vehicle before invoking the doctrine of imputed negligence.' 3
The doctrine can also be applied when a third person is trying to hold
the passenger liable to him because of the negligence of the driver. So
far this situation has not arisen in North Carolina, but when and if it
does, the court might well follow the Restatement of Torts rule14 and
9 James v. Atlantic & E. C. R. R., supra note 2 at 598.
14 BLASHFELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW, §2372 (Perm. Ed.).
" Id., cited in James v. Railroad, 233 N. C. 591, 598, 65 S. E. 2d 214, 219
(1951).
'- Otis v. Kolsky, 94 Pa. Super. 548 (1929) ; Lawrence v. Denver & R. G. Ry.
Co., 52 Utah" 414, 174 Pac. 817 (1918); Washington & 0. D. Railroad v. Zell,
118 Va. 755; 88 S. E. 309 (1916) ; Wentworth v. Town of Waterbury, 90 Vt. 60,
96 At. 334 (1916); Hurley v. City of Spokane, 126 Wash. 213, 217 Pac. 1004
(1923).
" Pusey v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., supra note 1 at 142. Without evidence
of joint control in the operation of the automobile, there can be no joint enterprise.
For other cases on this point, see Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 205
N. C. 127, 170 S. E. 120 (1933); Williams v. Seaboard A. L. R. R., 187 N. C.
348, 121 S. E. 608 (1924) ; White v. Carolina Realty Co., 182 N. C. 536, 109 S. E.
564 (1921) ; and cases cited therein.
For cases holding that there was no joint enterprise even though the element
of community of interest was present, see Jernigan v. Jernigan, 207 N. C. 831, 178
S. E. 587 (1935) and Newman v. Queen City Coach Co., 205 N. C. 26, 169 S. E.
808 (1933).
1 4
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §491 (1938), Any one of several persons engaged in
an enterprise is barred from recovery against a negligent defendant by the con-
1952)
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hold the passenger liable for the negligence of the driver in an action
by an injured third party.
However, the joint enterprise doctrine has no application in an
action by the injured participant in the enterprise against the driver of
the automobile. The reason for this is that the driver of an automobile
is always under a duty to exercise due care for the safety of his pas-
sengers.' 5 The position of the North Carolina court on this point was
not clearly stated until the recent decision of Rollison v. Hicks,10 in
which the court stated that the driver cannot invoke the doctrine of
joint enterprise as a defense in an action brought by his co-adventurer.
But apparently the negligence of the driver should be imputed to the
plaintiff in a suit against another passenger in the vehicle, all three of
them being engaged in a joint enterprise.1
7
The joint enterprise 'doctrine as applied to automobile accident cases
is based on an analogy with joint enterprises in business ventures, such
as partnerships. 18 There, all of the partners have a common interest,
the pooling of resources for the purpose of making a profit. One part-
ner can, by his negligence, bind his associates, and this is a sound rule
so far as business is concerned. The public is dealing with an organiza-
tion and has a right to be protected to the fullest extent. It is the
property aspect of the organization with which the doctrine is concerned.
However, in automobile accidents, the defendant is not deceived by
appearances, and he should not be permitted to escape liability merely
because the plaintiff and the driver were engaged in an activity for
mutual benefit and pleasure. The doctrine as applied to non-business
ventures has been criticized a good deal' 9 but it seems to be too thor-
oughly imbedded to be overruled by court decision.
It is often said that the 'doctrine is founded on the law of principal
tributory negligence of any other of them if the enterprise is so far joint that each
member of the group is responsible to third persons injured by the negligence of
a fellow member.
1 See collection of cases 65 C. J. S. p. 799 n. 38 (1950).
" Rollison v. Hicks, 233 N. C. 99, 63 S. E. 2d 190 (1951).
1" PaosszR, LAW OF TORTS, §65 (1941) : "Upon the analogy to the agency rule
that where two principals employ the same agent to deal with their common in-
terest, one cannot charge the other with misconduct of their mutual agent, unless
the other is personally at fault."
1865 C. J. S. NEGLIGENCE, §168 (1950).
"Gilmore v. Gross, 68 F. 2d 150, 153 (10th Cir. 1933) ; 4 BLASHFIELD, CYciLO-
PEDrA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW, §176 (1927); PROssER, LAW OF TORTS, §65 (1941);
Note, 12 N. C. L. Rv. 385 (1934).
"The doctrine of joint enterprise has, in rare instances, been applied in cases
dealing with other than automobile accidents and business ventures. One such
case is Cullinan v. Tetrault, 123 Me. 302, 122 AtI. 770 (1923), where the negli-
gence of one boy purchasing liquor for a drinking party was imputed to his com-
panion. Compare the refusal to apply the doctrine to pedestrians walking to-
gether, in Barnes v. Town of Marcus, 96 Iowa 675, 65 N. W. 984 (1896) . . .
With these few exceptions, all joint enterprise cases found have involved vehicles
or business ventures." PRossER, LAW OF ToRTs, p. 492, n. 26 (1941).
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and agent. 20 But it is hard to conceive that people engaged in a joint
enterprise for mutual pleasure consider themselves as agents of each
other. Another point which illustrates that the rule is a pure fiction,
with little if any basis in reality, is the fact that a member of a joint
enterprise is deemed by law to have a legal right to control the opera-
tion of the vehicle without having any actual control. A theoretical
right of control is thus a sufficient basis for imputing the negligence of
the driver to the passenger. Of course, if the passenger knows of ap-
proaching danger and fails to warn the driver, he himself may be liable
on the theory of actual negligence.21
One argument in favor of enforcing the joint enterprise rule is the
fact that the parties enter into the transaction or enterprise of their own
free will. Likewise they have the choice of withdrawing at their pleasure.
One striking point about the present case is the fact that the occupants
of the patrol car were fellow employees. They were working for a
common employer. The plaintiff had no choice in the selection of the
person with whom he would be associated during the patrol job. He
either had to ride with the man assigned with him or stand the risk of
losing his job. In view of this situation the court might have ruled that
an important element-the privilege of quitting the venture at will-
was lacking, and therefore it was not a true joint enterprise.
22
ROBERT L. WHITMIRE, JR.
Negligence-Automobiles--Sudden Appearance Doctrine
In a recent action for the wrongful death of a child,' the North
Carolina Supreme Court applied, for the first time, the descriptive phrase
"sudden appearance" to a doctrine long recognized in automobile negli-
gence cases. 2 This doctrine is applied in those cases where a motorist
strikes a theretofore unseen child who darts in front of his automobile.
Such an accident is regarded as unavoidable, thereby relieving the mo-
torist of liability.3 Generally, North Carolina has applied this doctrine
to cases where the child has run from behind another vehicle or has
0 Albritton v. Hill, 190 N. C. 429, 130 S. E. 5 (1925); 1 VARTANIAN, THE
LAW OF AUTOmOBILES, §59 (1947)." Central of Georgia R. R. v. Watkins, 37 F. 2d 710 (5th Cir. 1930).
2 For a case exactly in point, with the same result as the principal case, see
Collins v. Graves, 17 Cal. App. 2d 288, 61 P. 2d 1198 (1936).
' Register v. Gibbs, 233 N. C. 456, 64 S. E. 2d 280 (1951).
'In Butler v. Alien, 233 N. C. 484, 64 S. E. 2d 561 (1951), decided one week
later, this phrase appears in the headnote but not in the opinion. This phrase has
been used by other courts, however. Christian v. Smith, 78 Ga. App. 603, 51 S. E.
2d 857 (1949) ; Fultz' Adm'r. v. Williams, 266 Ky. 651, 99 S. W. 2d 803 (1936).
' See Notes, 113 A. L. R. 528, 536 (1938) ; 65 A. L. R. 192, 197 (1930). This
note does not deal with those cases involving the question of contributory negli-
gence on the part of the child. See generally, Note, 107 A. L. R. 5 (1937).
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